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Recently due to changes in New Zealand's employment laws there has been 
increased interest in the study of negotiation behaviour. Studies on the bargaining 
ability of men and women are inconsistent. To date there is no clear evidence which 
suggests that men or women are more effective negotiators. Few prior studies have 
compared the ability of the respective genders to achieve integrative agreements. 
The present research seeks to re-address this issue. Current research seeks to 
expand upon what is already known about the relationship between gender and the 
perception of negotiations by exploring the impact of variations in gender 
constitution of the dyad upon the achievement of integrative agreements. 
This study examines the role of the gender constitution of the dyad and cognitive 
feedback upon the prevalence of negotiator cognitive bias. Subjects were randomly 
allocated to one of four experimental conditions, male/male with feedback, 
female/female with feedback, male/female with feedback and the control group of 
male/female no feedback. Each dyad completed four novel integrative bargaining 
tasks, measures of performance and judgment accuracy were taken. 
The resufjhdicate that the cognitive feedback manipulation was ineffective in 
prompting increases in judgment accuracy, contrary to contemporary research. The 
performance of the dyads did appear to be affected by the gender pairing of the 
dyads, with the overall performance begtnnfng greatest in the all male paired 
dyads. 
vii 
These results are discussed in terms of the presentation and utility of cognitive 
feedback. The affect of the gender pairing of the dyads is explained using two 
approaches (a) the perceptions of the integrative bargaining potential of the 
negotiations from the outset, (b) perceptions of the integrative bargaining potential 
of a negotiation once negotiations have commenced. Implications for future 




CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW 
Negotiation is an essential form of social interaction, which permeates all levels of 
society. All of us engage in negotiations, as part of our everyday social interactions 
with co-workers, employers, family members and friends. Deciding which movie 
to go to with a friend, haggling over the price of a new car, or agreeing on wage 
increases, are all examples of various contexts of which negotiation is a part. 
Within a diversity of contexts people negotiate over the distribution of scarce 
resources. Common sense dictates that wherever resources must be distributed, 
negotiation should occur. Frequently, both parties endeavour to divide all the 
available resources, so their own best interests are realised. 
Negotiation is essentially a decision-making task where a mutual decision is made 
concerning the allocation of scarce resources, where no predetermined rules for 
settlement exist (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Pruitt, 1981). It requires opposing 
parties to engage in an interactive process, through a series of offers and 
acceptance/rejection responses, if a mutually acceptable settlement is to be reached. 
The negotiation process provides alternatives to submission to adversaries, reliance 
upon more powerful associates, arbitration, or other aggressive or more violent 
tactics, as a means of conflict resolution. 
Bargaining and negotiation are tools of conflict resolution in today's society. The 
capacity to negotiate effectively allows the achievement of social objectives or goals, 
which mark progress in society. Conversely, suboptimal or unsatisfactory 
negotiation settlements may facilitate reductions in productivity, decreases in 
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organizational harmony, weaken trade links or even threaten the survival of a 
nation (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987). Implications resulting from an understanding 
of negotiation are broad, and may even impact upon issues such as world peace, 
political and trade relations. 
Part One of the present study reviews the integrative bargaining literature. The first 
chapter provides an overview of negotiation as an important form of social 
interaction. Chapter Two, reviews the contemporary negotiation literature, 
specifically research on negotiator bias, and the effects of cognitive feedback and 
gender differences on negotiation performance. The final chapter in Part One 
provides a rationale for the current study, presenting the research questions which 
this study seeks to address. Part Two outlines the methodology of the present 
research. This includes; task, subjects, procedure, manipulations and dependent 
measures. Part Three consists of a summary of the findings of the present research. 
Finally Part Four provides a discussion of the findings and the limitations of the 
present research. Implications for future research in this area are discussed. 
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CHAPER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In recent years various social and economic changes have prompted the poliferation 
of interest in dispute resolution. The interdisciplinary contribution to the study of 
negotiation is evidence of a broad interest in social conflict. Research on negotiation 
behaviour and outcomes can be found within the fields of psychology, economics, 
industrial relations, organizational behaviour, sociology and law (Thompson, 
1990c). Negotiation research has emerged as a major topic of interest for 
organizational theorists, prompting the development of an understanding of how 
negotiators perceive the bargaining context. 
The goal of negotiation research is to maximise negotiating efficiency (Bazerman, 
1986; Raiffa, 1982). As a consequence, empirical and theoretical attention is now 
being directed towards understanding the dynamics of the negotiation process. The 
current trend in negotiation research is to view individuals as seekers, monitors 
and generators of information (Herold & Parsons, 1985) and as interactive 
information processes, rather than inactive recipients. Recent research seeks to 
extend the study of negotiation behaviour beyond the investigation of negotiator 
responses, towards examination of the role played by negotiators in negotiations. 
Due to the prevalence of negotiation as a process involved in social judgment, it is 
tempting to conclude that most negotiators achieve optimal settlements. However 
the most common finding of several decades of negotiation research, is that people 
in bargaining or negotiation situations frequently fail to reach settlements of mutual 
benefit (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Thompson, 1990a). This finding contradicts the 
axioms of normative theories of negotiation behaviour, because negotiators 
systematically violate key principles of rationality. Deviations from early 
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prescriptive accounts of how people should behave in competitive situations (Cross, 
1965; Harsanyi, 1956, Nash, 1950) have been largely attributed to the existence of 
faulty negotiator judgment (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). 
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF NEGOTIATION 
In describing the state of dyadic negotiation research three major frameworks for 
conceptualising dyadic bargaining have been proposed: economic models, 
structural effects, and personality differences among negotiators. Each is briefly 
reviewed below. Each of the frameworks and the research perspectives for 
conceptualising bargaining referred to in this report focus on the most basic unit of 
conflict, the dyad. 
Early perscriptive strategies, focused upon how negotiators should behave in order 
to reach optimal outcomes. One such approach is the economic model of 
negotiation behaviour. Economic models are founded upon the assumption that all 
negotiators are rational utility maximisers. Raiffa (1982) comments 
"Game theorists ..... examine what ultra smart, impeccably rational, super 
people should do in competitive, interactive situations. They are not 
interested in the way erring folds like you and me actually behave, but in how 
we should behave if we were smarter, thought harder, were more consistent, 
and were all knowing" (p.21) 
Economic models are criticised for their failure to explore central constructs that 
may allow accurate prediction and description of the negotiation process (Neale & 
Bazerman, 1985b). They serve to provide an analysis of what negotiators should do 
within the bargaining context, rather than what negotiators actually do (Farber & 
Katz, 1979; Nash, 1950). 
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Structural characteristics, specifically third party impasse procedures (Kochan, 1980; 
Stevens, 1966; Neale, 1984; Neale & Bazerman, 1982) and constituencies (Walton & 
McKersie, 1965; Lamm & Kogon, 1970; Podell & Knapp, 1969), have also been 
explored as potential explanations for the failure of negotiators to reach pareto-
optimal agreements (optimal settlements for both parties). This approach has been 
useful, in that it allows a degree of prediction of where a settlement is most likely to 
occur, based on a set of factors external to the negotiators. 
An alternative approach to understanding bargaining focuses on an examination of 
the role of negotiator personality, including experience, background and 
expectations. A large volume of research has successfully identified characteristics 
which inhibit the achievement of favourable agreements (Rubin & Brown, 1975), 
e.g. risk taking propensity (Harnett1 Cummings & Hughes1 1968), low negotiator 
bargaining aspirations (Thompson, 1990a) and lack of negotiation experience 
(Thompson, 1990b). This approach has been widely criticised for its inability to 
establish a theoretical perspective that explains exactly why these individuals are 
less likely to reach agreement. It has been suggested that it merely serves to 
provide information on why negotiators may fail to reach rational settlements, and 
appears unable to provide a more generalized explanation for the relationships 
(Neale & Bazerman, 1985). 
Each of these three different perspectives has made a significant contribution to 
our understanding of bargaining behaviour, by providing the literature with 
some limited means of predicting when a settlement is most likely to be made. 
All identify factors that affect the resolution of a negotiation. However1 they fail 
to directly address the central question of why negotiators fail to reach agreement, 
despite the existence of a ready available and mutually beneficial outcomes. 
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Criticisms of these approaches point to the need for a theoretical framework that 
does more than merely describe the ideal negotiation process, but rather seeks to 
document how and why negotiators react to the bargaining context in the ways 
they do. 
BEHAVIOURAL DECISION THEORY 
Each negotiator has a threshold value that needs to be achieved in order to make 
participation in negotiations worthwhile (Raiffa, 1982). The point at which the 
threshold values of the competiting negotiators overlap is defined as a zone of 
agreement. Behavioural decision theory seeks to answer the following question: 
If it is rational for a settlement to occur whenever a zone of agreement 
exists, why do negotiators sometimes fail to reach agreement despite the 
existence of a zone of agreement?" (Neale & Bazerman, 1985b) 
The behavioural decision approach provides a contrast to earlier prescriptive 
approaches by identifying the existence of systematic judgmental deficiencies, 
which depart from negotiator rationality. Raiffa (1982) notes that the development 
of a strong theoretical construct for negotiation behaviour must be founded upon an 
accurate understanding of how people actually negotiate. 
The behavioural decision theory provides a backdrop against which the dynamics 
of negotiator behaviour may be explored, by allowing an integration and extension 
of existing knowledge. It provides a theoretical approach grounded in a framework 
which prompts the development of a descriptive rather than prescriptive account of 
negotiator behaviour. It supports the framework of Walton and McKersie's (1965) 
distributive and integrative models of negotiation behaviour, which focus on the 
direct interaction between negotiators, which will be discussed later. 
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The behavioural decision making perspective is characterised by its perception of 
each party in the negotiation as an independent decision maker. The behaviours of 
each party are seen as choices based on judgments made by each negotiator about 
the negotiation situation. The behaviour of each negotiator is the result of the 
consideration of available information, an analysis of their opponent's behaviour 
and the prediction of future events, (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987). Negotiators' 
perceptions of the negotiation situation whether of the opponent's interests or of the 
success of the negotiation, frequently differ considerably from those predicted by 
more objective economic analysis. 
Behavioural decision theory literature has proposed a number of systematic 
deficiencies which impede rational decision making. It has been responsible for the 
identification of a number of systematic cognitive limitations that affect the ability 
of the negotiator to adopt prescriptive negotiation strategies (Bazerman & Carroll, 
1987; Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale, 1985; Bazerman & 
Neale, 1985, Thompson & Hastie, 1990, Neale & Bazerman, 1985b). Behavioural 
decision theory provides a theoretical anchor for the present research, by 
undertaking further exploration of the prevalence of cognitive bias in negotiator 
behaviour. 
RATIONALITY 
Early negotiation research assumed rationality of both process and outcome within 
the bargaining situation. Research data indicate exactly the converse, namely that 
despite the existence of a positive zone of agreement, negotiators continue to behave 
in ways inconsistent with normative models of negotiation behaviour (Bazerman & 
Carroll, 1987; Neale & Bazerman, 1985b). If negotiators were rational, where a 
positive zone of agreement exists, settlement would always occur. Conversely, in 
the absence of a positive zone of agreement, resolution would be impossible 
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(Bazerman & Neale, 1985). Interestingly, often despite the existence of a zone of 
agreement, opposing parties may not reach a settlement (Raiffa, 1982). This has lead 
to wide criticism of the rationality assumption upon which prescriptive strategies of 
negotiation behaviour are founded (Bazerman, 1983). 
This argument is strongly supported by empirical research which illustrates that 
negotiators deviate from decisions maximising utility, in often systematic and 
predictable ways (Hogarth, 1981; Kahneman, Slavic & Tversky, 1982). Both 
laboratory and case/field studies have consistently found that negotiators 
frequently fail to reach integrative solutions (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Pruitt & 
Rubin, 1986; Raiffa, 1982). Instead they settle with suboptimal agreements, often 
reducing the value of the outcome for both parties (Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale, 
1985, Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Research has consistently illustrated that a large 
amount of sub-optimality exists within the negotiation context, as a consequence of 
negotiators' non-rational cognitions. 
Typically negotiator's do not carry out a fu~rational assessment/ of the negotiation 
situation, and frequently distort or ignore information presented to them 
(Thompson, 1990b), in favour of the persistence of their own preconceived notions 
of opponent interests and priorities. A large body of evidence existsl-vhich suggests 
that people frequently fail to recognise the integrative potential present in 
negotiation situations (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Thomson & Hastie, 1990a, 1990b; 
Carroll, Bazerman & Maury, 1988; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Raiffa, 1982). As a 
consequence, negotiators often settle upon outcomes which are less than optimal, 
for both parties (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Inconsistencies in the cognitive 
process of negotiators serve to negate the popular assumption that negotiators are 




Bazerman & Carroll (1987) define negotiation as "a process by which two or more 
interdependent parties who do not have identical preferences across decision 
alternatives, make joint decisions" (pg. 248). Where parties have a complete conflict 
of ideas, opinions or beliefs the negotiation is termed distributive (Raiffa, 1982; 
Walton & McKersie, 1_965). A negotiation that is variable sum in nature, with the 
potential for joint gains to be made is known as integrative (Follett, 1940; Raiffa, 
1982; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Integrative agreements occur when the interests of 
both parties are neither completely opposed nor completely compatible, and where 
the gains of one party will not be directly reflected in the losses of the opposing 
party. 
A situation is said to have integrative potential if multiple issues are involved and if 
the competing parties have different preferences among these issues. For example, 
imagine that a couple are deciding where to spend their annual holiday. The 
husband prefers a cabin in the mountains, while the wife has a preference for a 
luxury hotel on the seashore. The couple may be said to have reached an 
integrative agreement if they decide to spend their vacation in a luxury hotel in the 
mountains (Pruitt, 1981). Integrative agreements are preferable over compromises 
because they allow negotiators to reach agreement in situations that otherwise have 
the potential to result in stalemates. In addition ~{are more stable over time and 
they foster more positive relationships between opposing parties (Pruitt & Rubin, 
1986). 
The achievement of integrative agreements is founded upon the. capacity of the 
negotiating parties to logroll. Logrolling requires each party to trade off concessions 
on their least important issues in return for gained concessions upon issues of 
primary importance to them. Froman & Cohen (1970), compared the capacity of 
logroll to exploit the potential for joint profit in a standard multiple-issue 
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bargaining situation, with that of compromise. Not unexpectedly, their results 
were consistent with the existing literature, i.e. that of the two bargaining processes, 
logrolling produced the most profitable settlements. This suggests that the ability to 
logroll issues is a key ingredient in the achievement of an integrative agreement, 
particularly in complex multi-issue tasks such as contract negotiation in labour 
relations. 
Work by Pruitt (1981, 1983; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) brought integrative bargaining to 
the fore of negotiation research. Pruitt (1983) discovered two important antecedents 
to the achievement of integrative agreements: high aspirations (negotiator's drive to 
satisfy their own demands) and problem-solving orientation (ability of a negotiator 
to recognise that each party has a different set of priorities). The presence of these 
factors increases the likelihood that, if integrative potential exists, it will be realised. 
Thompson (1990a) explored the impact of experience with integrative tasks on the 
ability of negotiators to reach integrative settlements. Findings suggest, that 
negotiators are able to generalize the skills required to make mutually beneficial 
agreements, to a further novel task. Thompson concluded, that experience with 
tasks with integrative potential substantially increases negotiator performance, 
although surprisingly, the ability to identify the existence of compatible interests 
was not affected by experience. 
Thompson extended her earlier research by comparing the respective ability of 
both naive and experienced negotiators to reach integrative solutions (Thompson, 
1990b). Intuitively it is tempting to assume that expert negotiators will out-perform 
novices. The results of Thompson's research fail to support this assertion; in fact 
they suggest that minimal experience is necessary to achieve a highly integrative 
solution. 
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THE NEGOTIATOR AS AN INTERACTIVE PARTICIPANT 
Central to the understanding and eventual prediction of negotiator behaviour, is 
examination of the role played by the negotiator. Contemporary negotiation 
research views the negotiator as an active participant in the negotiation process, 
rather than as a passive recipient. The negotiation context is mediated by judgments 
made by the negotiators during the course of the exchange. Pinkley & Northcraft 
(1989) (cited in Neale & Northcraft, 1991) note that the negotiator's interpretation of 
the dispute significantly impacts upon the content of the agreement. The 
negotiator's perception of the negotiation context is therefore a critical determinant, 
of negotiator behaviour. 
The basic psychological principle, that behaviour is a function of the interaction of 
the individual with the environment, may be applied to the decision making 
context. The unique characteristics of the negotiator interact with those of the 
situation to produce different decision making outcomes. Each individual brings to 
the negotiation a distinct set of experiences, backgrounds and expectations that 
affect their behaviour and subsequent performance (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). Each 
negotiator has a unique cognitive structure which regulates their ability to process 
information and hence, their capacity to negotiate (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987). An 
individual's potential to be a successful negotiator is a function of the integration of 
these two factors, the individual's cognitive processes and their experience with 
negotiation. 
FIXED PIE PERCEPTION 
Carroll, Bazerman & Maury (1988), assert that negotiators have a limited cognitive 
capacity in these situations. Researchers have consistently cited faulty judgment as 
responsible for suboptimal decision making by negotiators (Bazerman & Carroll, 
1987; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Behavioural decision theory has identified a 
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number of systematic biases in negotiators' cognitions that cause irrational 
negotiator judgments. Five unique biases have been identified which create 
cognitive limitations: (1) the impact of the negotiator's frame (Bazerman, Magliozzi 
& Neale, 1985), (2) the non-rational escalation of conflict (Bazerman, 1983), (3) 
negotiator overconfidence (Bazerman & Neale, 1982), (4) the winner's curse 
(Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and (5) the mythical fixed pie (Bazerman, 1983). 
Due to its pervasiveness and its importance to the achievement of integrative 
agreements, the fixed-pie myth has been the focus of a large body of research 
(Thompson & Hastie, 1990). The existence of the fixed-pie myth is strongly 
supported by the negotiation literature as a key explanation for sub-optimal 
negotiation settlements. The fixed pie expectation that one's own interests are 
directly opposed to one's opponent's interests represents a serious judgment error, 
limiting the negotiators capacity to realize the potential for mutually beneficial 
trades. Those who perceive negotiations with a fixed-pie perception are less likely 
to reach integrative agreements than those who do not possess this bias (Thompson 
& Hastie, 1990). 
Contemporary research has established the existence of a relationship between 
judgment accuracy and negotiation performance (Carroll, Bazerman, & Maury, 
1988; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson, 1990a, 1990b; Thompson, 1991). Earlier 
researchers mainly inferred the existence of judgment bias, and its subsequent 
effect on negotiation outcomes. Research by Thompson & Hastie (1990) was the first 
work to measure quantitatively the existence of errors in negotiator judgment. 
Thompson & Hastie found that most naive negotiators adopt a "fixed pie" 
perception when entering negotiations, evaluating the relative importance to their 
opponent of the to-be-negotiated issues as the same as for the self. Evidence 
suggests that these biases may also be prevalent in expert as well as a naive subject 
populations (Neale & Northcraft, 1986). 
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Given that negotiators seldom engage in one shot negotiations, this raises the 
question of the role of experience in the development of fixed-pie perceptions. 
Thompson (1990a) found support for her hypothesis, that experience in distributive 
negotiations reinforces negotiator's fixed-pie perceptions. Experience with 
bargaining tasks with integrative potential, allows negotiators to break the fixed-pie 
assumption and to attain pareto-optimal settlements (Mc Alister, Bazerman & 
Fader, 1986, Thompson, 1990a). Bazerman et al (1985) found, using a novel 
integrative bargaining task that required both cooperation (perception of 
compatible interests) and competition (direct conflict of interests), that it was the 
competitive element that becomes immediately salient, facilitating the adoption of a 
win-lose orientation by negotiators. 
Examination of factors which mediate the prevalence of negotiator judgmental 
biases represents the next critical step in the development of the conflict literature. 
To date, the existing judgment accuracy literature has been concerned with the 
relationship between judgment accuracy and performance. (Thompson & Hastie, 
1990; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1992, Thompson, 1990). It is now widely accepted 
that judgment accuracy is a key ingredient in the resolution of conflict. However a 
theory of negotiator judgment must do more that merely demonstrate the existence 
of judgmental errors. Neale & Bazerman (1985b), note that resistance to negotiator 
cognitive bias lies in the awareness of its prevalence, and the factors which mediate 
its effect. 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
Negotiation is clearly an interactive behaviour. Casual observation of daily 
exchanges between individuals is all that is necessary to recognise that 
personalities and characteristics of the conflicting parties affect the resolution 
process. Although there are infinite examples from everyday life that individual 
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traits and characteristics do affect the role played by an individual in a negotiation 
task, this assumption is not supported unequivocally by the empirical literature. 
Research on the role of the individual personality and its impact upon negotiation 
performance, began in the late 1950s, and constitutes one of the most controversial 
areas of research in this field. Early research on individual differences was 
preoccupied with the impact of background, demographics and personality factors. 
Rubin and Brown (1975) reviewed over 200 quantitative studies of individual 
differences that might be responsible for differences in bargaining performance, and 
were unable to firmly establish any systematic relationships. Other individual 
variables explored have included: risk-taking propensity, perceived locus of 
control, strength of social motives and levels of self-concept (Lewicki & Litterer, 
1985). 
As a direct consequence, individual differences research constitutes one of the most 
controversial areas in the existing negotiation literature. Several explanations have 
been tendered in an effort to explain the maze of contradictory and inconclusive 
findings in the existing individual differences literature. These are outlined by 
Lewicki & Litterer (1985) in their book Negotiation . One potential explanation for 
such inconsistent findings suggests that the impact of "structural" variables may 
supersede the effects of individual differences (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). In essence 
the presence of factors external to the individual may serve to mask the effect of 
individual differences on negotiationbehaviour. For example experience within the 
negotiation environment, negotiator power, constituency pressure, and opponent 
behaviour may overshadow whatever initial predispositions individuals may hold. 
Additionally, relationships between structural variables may obscure or inhibit the 
emergence of individual differences, thus reducing their impact. This is illustrated 
in early negotiation research which frequently employed a simple, two-choice, 
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conflict game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, as the simulated conflict scenario. The 
Prisoner's Dilemma consists of a simple decision-making paradigm, requiring 
subjects to make repeated choices between competitive and cooperative decision 
alternatives, while isolated from their opponent both verbally and visually. This is 
not at all representative of the complex interactive environment, characteristic of 
most negotiations. 
Another explanation proposed to account for the current state of differential 
research in this field includes criticism of early research methodologies. Due to the 
subtle and elusive nature of these variables, it is possible that early research 
instruments, measurements and reporting styles were too simple to detect 
individual differences which may exist. The designs of many studies attempting to 
explore individual differences, are widely criticised for their unsystematic, 
disorganised methods and unscientific conduct. As a consequence direct 
comparisons between different research designs, methods and bargaining 
paradigms may be responsible for the emergence of inconclusive findings. 
GENDER DIFFERENCES 
The present research is primarily concerned with one specific individual attribute, 
gender. There have been many studies conducted on the effects of gender 
differences in negotiation. Rubin & Brown, in their book The Social Psychology of 
Bargaining and Negotiation (1975), reviewed the then existing empirical literature on 
background, demographic, and personality factors, which have been hypothesized 
to effect to negotiation behaviour. From their review of over 100 studies on gender 
differences and their effects on bargaining behaviour, they found, 30 studies 
revealed no gender differences, 20 studies reported males as more cooperative than 
females, while many other studies concluded that females exhibited more 
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cooperative traits when negotiating when compared to males. Such inconclusive 
findings are representative of much of the research on individual differences. 
Lewicki & Litterer (1985) comment 
"From what is known now, it does not appear that there is any single personalit}f/( 
type or characteristic that is directly and clearly linked to success in negotiation" (p. 
276). 
It is proposed that such a conclusion is premature. Due to the dynamic nature of 
negotiation, it is plausible to assume that some kind of relationship exists between 
personality type and characteristics, and the behaviour of individuals. Casual 
observation of everyday activities and interactions are evidence that our personality 
and interactive style affect the way we deal with others. Therefore it is reasonable 
to assume, that characteristics of the negotiator will influence their behaviour and 
subsequent outcomes in a confrontational situation. Such an argument has intuitive 
appeal. 
Evidence exists to suggest that men and women perceive negotiations differently 
(Pinkley, 1990; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973). It appears that men are primarily 
interested in winning and maximising outcomes, and women are concerned with 
maintenance of the negotiation relationship (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-
Goldband & Carnevale, 1980). Pinkley (1990) found that women were likely to view 
a negotiation in terms of relationships while men were likely to be concerned with 
the exchange of resources. An unpublished study by Neale & Northcraft suggests 
that the negotiators propensity to negotiate is significantly correlated with gender, 
thus affecting the conceptualisation of the integrative potential of a situation. The 
suggestion that men and women perceive negotiation in different ways has 
implications for understanding why negotiator's judgments commonly deviate from 
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rationality. Examination of the prevalence of biases among men and women allows 
researchers to explore factors which maybe responsible for negotiators' lack of 
rationality. 
COGNITIVE FEEDBACK 
The notion that if an individual is provided with feedback, performance will be 
increased has been a long standing psychological principle. Behavioural decision 
making theory (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Hogarth, 1981) accounts for suboptimal 
decisions in terms of an absence of feedback from the negotiation environment. 
) A considerable amount of empirical research has examined the impact of feedback 
upon individuals' motivation and learning (Adams, 1968; Ammonds, 1956). It is 
also widely held that feedback affects negotiator performance by allowing 
negotiators to understand and improve upon prior performance, by reducing 
commitment to incorrect strategies and through the development of judgment 
accuracy (Hogarth, 1981). 
In dyadic negotiations, each negotiating party is required to make an assessment of 
their opponent's interests and priorities in order to formulate a 'plan of attack'. An 
accurate appraisal of the opponent's interests is critical to the development of 
integrative agreements (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Negotiator's interests cannot be 
directly observed, and it is seldom that negotiating parties reveal to their opponents . 
where their interests lie. Negotiations are often single episodes, with little 
information exchange between parties, and this makes it difficult to learn about the 
opponent's interests. Negotiators are forced to guess or infer on the basis of patterns 
of reciprocity and concession, as the negotiation proceeds, the true interests of their 
opponent. 
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Due to the interactive nature of negotiation, negotiators are supplied with an almost 
constant stream of feedback, which they can utilize to re-evaluate their behaviour 
and decisions (Hammond, McClelland & Mumpower, 1980). Negotiators may use 
this feedback to revise their judgments of their opponents and apply what they have 
learned to subsequent negotiations (Thompson & DeHarpport, 1992). Einhorn & 
Hogarth (1978) developed a model to represent the self-correcting function of 
· feedback. The judgment-action model, proposes that an individual's initial 
judgment and assessment of the situation determine their subsequent actions and 
behaviour, which affects the outcome achieved. In short the interaction of 
judgments, actions and the environment produces outcomes (Thompson et al, 
1992). 
From this model, Balzer, Dohery & O'Connor (1989) distinguished two types of 
feedback: outcome feedback (knowledge of results) and cognitive feedback 
(information about relations between cues in the environment). It is widely accepted 
that outcome feedback is generally ineffective for increasing judgment accuracy and 
performance in complex uncertain environments (Hoffman, Earle, & Slovic, 1981; 
Balzer et al 1989, Brehmer, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Some have gone so far 
as to assert that outcome feedback has not only a negative effect on negotiation 
outcomes, but may actually impede performance (Hammond, Summers & Deane, 
1973). Research indicates that in both laboratory and field settings, cognitive 
feedback improves performance on multiple cue probability learning tasks (Balke, 
Hammond, & Meyer, 1973; Hammond & Adelman, 1976, Hammond & Boyle, 1971; 
Steinmann, 197 4). 
Balzer, Doherty & O'Connor (1989) in their review of the empirical literature 
comparing cognitive and outcome feedback, conclude that in general cognitive 
feedback does improve performance on judgment tasks. Cognitive feedback refers 
to information about relations (e.g. learn about the underlying interests of opposing 
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party), as opposed to information about outcomes (e.g. opponents net gains from 
settlements) (Balzer, Doherty & O'Connor, 1989). Balke, Hammond & Meyer (1973) 
report favourable reactions to the presence of cognitive feedback, based upon 
subjective reports by management and union negotiators. Tucker (1982, cited in 
Blazer et al 1989) reports negotiators found that cognitive feedback provided insight 
to the negotiation process. The success of cognitive feedback has been attributed to 
its ability to facilitate increased understanding of both the negotiator's own interests 
and that of their opponents. 
Balzer et al (1989) conceptualizes cognitive feedback as three distinct components: 
information about the task, information about the cognitive system and information 
about the relation between the cognitive and the task systems (Thompson et al, 
1992). Task information refers to the relationship between the cues and the criterion. 
Cognitive information refers to the relations perceived by the individual. 
Functional validity information describes the relations between the criterion and 
individual judgment. When applied to a negotiation paradigm this translates 
respectively to a relation between opponent's interests and their behaviour, 
relations between a negotiator's judgment and behaviour of the opponent, and the 
relation between the negotiator's judgment and the true interest of the opponent 
(Thompson, et al 1992). Existing research suggests that task information is a central 
component responsible for the performance enhancing effect of cognitive feedback. 
This introduction explores deviations from rational decision making, frequentl~ 
made by negotiators. It adopts behavioural decision theory as the main theoretica 
framework for conceptualizing dyadic bargaining in the present research, and usin1 
this framework seeks to explore the achievement of integrative agreements. Thi 
investigation of the effects of gender differences upon negotiation behaviour anc 
outcomes constitutes one of the most controversial areas in the negotiation literature 
However, Lewicki & Litterer (1985) and Rubin & Brown (1975) concluded that littl, 
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support had been found for the main effect of gender differences in negotiatio1 
performance. Yet evidence does exist to suggest that men and women perceiv1 
negotiations differently (Pinkley, 1990). In addition , using Balzer et al (1989 
feedback models, outcome feedback and cognitive feedback are distinguished. Thi: 
enables the researcher to highlight the importance of the presence of cognitiv1 
feedback in enhancing negotiation performance, due to its ability to communicate th1 
relationships between the interests of the two competing negotiators. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RATIONALE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From the review of the literature it is easy to see that negotiation is an important 
tool for conflict resolution in many areas of society. A comprehensive 
understanding of the negotiation process is necessary to facilitate the achievement 
of optimal negotiator response. 
The present research follows the lead taken by Neale & Bazerman (1991) in 
concentrating upon judgments made by parties and about the negotiation situation 
and their opponents, and its effect upon their subsequent behaviour. Viewing 
negotiation as a decision making process provides a key to understanding it. The 
objective in examining negotiation as a decision making behaviour allows an 
evaluation of ways in which negotiators deviate from rational thought and how this 
affects the achievement of mutually beneficial agreements. 
It is widely held, by writers in this field, that most negotiations contain the potential 
for the achievement of an integrative settlement (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Raiffa, 1982). 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand how and why negotiators define the 
negotiation context in the way they do. Smith (1987) argues that although the 
negotiation context affects bargaining it must not be forgotten that it is interpreted 
through 'personal filters'. In essence people do affect bargaining. *Of the scant 
number of clear relationships reported, those with the most potential to explain 
negotiator behaviour, include variables such as cognitive reasoning ability and 
individual performance, as well as negotiator gender and perceptions of 
negotiation (reference). Thompson cautions that these assumptions are founded on 
a small number of studies and hence require further examination, before more 
general conclusions can be drawn. 
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A comprehensive description of negotiation should include information on the role 
of the negotiator (reference). Analysis and eventual understanding of the effect of 
individual differences in negotiator cognitions is important in the establishment of 
decision making optimality. Although progress has been made in the last two 
decades of negotiation research1 a considerable knowledge gap exists concerning 
whether or not negotiation behaviour is affected by gender specific cognitive 
processes. The current research aims to address this shortfal11 by the examination of 
the degree to which the gender constitution of the dyad affects the interpretation of 
the integrative potential of the negotiation. It also explores the question of whether 
gender is predictive of specific bargaining strategy. 
Little research to date has explored the factors which mediate the performance 
enhancing effects of cognitive feedback. The literature has moved no further than to 
delineate the utility of the resource1 at the expense of ignoring the role of the 
individual in the process. This shift in focus is evident in the current research and 
its emphasis on the role of feedback as more than a valuable organizational 
resource1 but as an important individual resource (Ashford & Cummings1 1983). In 
essence1 the present experiment was designed to test the generalizability of the 
effectiveness of cognitive feedback on multi-issue1 integrative bargaining tasks. 
In the experiment, negotiators would be provided with a copy of their opponent's 
payoff schedule, in a procedure similar to that used by Thompson & Hastie (1992), 
who provided subjects with an opportunity to examine the underlying interests of 
their opponents. The effectiveness of feedback on judgment accuracy and 
performance would be compared with control groups who received no feedback. 
The gender constitution of the dyad was also to be manipulated1 by having female1 
male or mixed gender pairs. This allowed the examination of the effects of gender 
upon the prevalence of significant cognitive bias. 
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The following research questions were posed: 
1. Will the gender constitution of the dyad affect the negotiation outcome in terms 
of performance on logroll and compatible issues ? 
2 .. Will the gender constitution of the dyad affect a negotiator's judgment accuracy 
on logroll and compatible issues ? 
3. Will cognitive feedback affect the negotiation outcome in terms of performance 
on logroll and compatible issues ? 
4. Will cognitive feedback affect the negotiation outcome in terms of judgment 





90 subjects were drawn randomly from undergraduate psychology subject pools at 
the University of Canterbury. These subjects were contacted by phone by the 
experimenter and asked to participate in the experiment. Of those approached, 80 
subjects agreed to participate in experimentation, in return for a cash incentive. 
Each subject's name was entered in a lottery for a cash prize of $100, to be drawn 
once data collection had been completed. This draw was not influenced by the 
performance of the subjects on the experimental tasks. The experimental sample 
had equal numbers of male and female subjects. 
NEGOTIATION TASKS 
Following the signing of consent forms, subjects were told they would engage in 
several negotiations with another subject. They were not told exactly how many 
negotiation tasks they would be required to complete (Thompson et al 1992). This 
was done to avoid end-game effects, which occur when subjects anticipate the end 
of experimentation, and, as a direct consequence, change their behaviour e.g. take 
less care or settle for increasingly suboptimal agreements. Subjects were presented 
with a payoff matrix for each negotiation task Four different negotiation tasks were 
used to avoid subjects simply agreeing to the same terms as in prior negotiation 
rounds (see Appendix 1). For example, if the same task was used for each round of 
negotiations, negotiators would simply agree to the same terms as in earlier tasks, 
eliminating the need for negotiators to bargain. 
The four tasks differed in their content, setting and the issues to be negotiated in 
each case. For example, one task involved the negotiation of terms of employment 
for a government employee. The five issues to be negotiated in this task were; 
salary, vacation, annual rise, start date and medical coverage. The other three tasks 
involved, purchasing a car, settlement of a tenancy agreement and planning a 
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holiday. The number of points earned by the negotiator for the settlement of each 
issue was represented in the payoff matrices by a bold figure in brackets. 
Negotiators were unaware of the points earned by their opponent for the settlement 
of each issue. 
All negotiation tasks had the same format. Each task consisted of five to-be-
negotiated issues: two issues were distributive in nature; two issues contained the 
potential to be logrolled; and one issue was included upon which parties had 
compatible interests. It should be recalled that distributive issues, are purely fixed 
sum, where gains for one party result in equal losses for their opponent. Logroll 
issues are variable-sum issues, and occur when gains for one party do not represent 
equal and opposing losses for the other. Compatible issues are characterised as 
those issues for which both parties have identical preferences, where a gain for one 
party represents an equal gain for the opposing party (Thompson et al, 1992). 
TABLE 1: Payoff Matrices for Negotiator A, Task 1 
SALARY (1) VAC (d) RISE (d) DATE (c) MED (1) 
$24 (660) 3 Wks (240) 15 % (360) May 5 (300) 100% (100) 
$23 (495) 2.5 Wks (180) 12 % (270) May 10 (225) 80% (75) 
$22 (330) 2 Wks (120) 9% (180) May 13 (150) 60% (50) 
$21 (165) 1.5 Wks (60) 6% (90) May 15 (75) 40% (25) 
$20 (0) 1 Wk (0) 3% (0) May 27 (0) 20% (0) 
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TABLE 2: Payoff Matrices for Negotiator B, Task 1 
SALARY (1) VAC (d) RISE (d) DATE (c) MED (1) 
$24 (0) 3 Wks (0) 15% (0) May 5 (300) 100% (0) 
$23 (25) 2.5 Wks (60) 12% (90) May 10 (225) 80% (165) 
$22 (50) 2 Wks (120) 9% (180) May 13 (150) 60% (330) 
$21 (75) 1.5 Wks (180) 6% (270) May 15 (75) 40% (495) 
$20 (100) 1 Wk (240) 3% (360) May 27 (0) 20% (660) 
Table 1 demonstrates examples of the pay-off matrices used, in this case for the five 
issu,1in Task 1. In this task, the logroll issues were salary and medical, the 
distributive issues, vacation and annual raise, and the compatible issue start date 
(see Appendix 1). 
PROCEDURE 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were required a sign a consent form. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either buyer or seller roles and then paired with 
another subject, for a total of 80 dyads. 10 dyads were constructed for each of the 
following conditions: 
TABLE 3. Summary Table of Experimental Conditions 
Condition Dyad Constitution Feedback 
1 male/male yes 
2 female/ female yes 
3 male/ female yes 
4 control male/ female no 
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Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions 
(male/male dyad with feedback, female/female dyad with feedback, male/female 
dyad with feedback) and because it was thought that the provision of feedback 
might have unintentionally affected behaviour, and to one control condition 
consisting of a male/female dyad without feedback. Subjects remained in the same 
condition, and negotiated with the same partner for the entire duration of the 
experiment. 
Subjects were given a brief quiz, to ensure that they understood the structure of the 
payoff matrices. The quiz required subjects to indicate, based upon the information 
provided in the practice payoff matrices, which issue was of most importance (in 
terms of points) to them, which issue was of least importance, and what their 
ultimate settlement would be (the settlement that would give them the most points). 
Those who answered incorrectly had the correct interpretation explained to them 
until it they understood the structure of the matrices clearly. Subjects frequently 
misunderstood the nature of the matrices, with approximately 45% requiring 
additional explanation. 
Subjects engaged in four negotiation tasks, with ten minutes being allowed for the 
completion of each task. Subjects negotiated face to face with no restrictions on 
communication, except that they were instructed not to physically exchange their 
payoff schedules (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Subjects were instructed to earn as many 
points as they could for themselves in each negotiation. In addition, they were 
informed that failure to reach an agreement within the time allotted to each task, 
would result in both parties earning zero points. 
Following each negotiation round, but before the feedback manipulation, a 
judgment accuracy measure was taken. Subjects were provided with a blank payoff 
schedule similar to the one given in the experiment, and required to fill the blanks 
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with numbers to indicate what they thought their opponent's payoff schedule 
looked like. Subjects were allowed to refer to their own payoff schedule1 in order to 
make a judgment about their opponent's matrices. 
FEEDBACK MANIPULATION 
All conditions1 excluding the control group1 were provided with cognitive feedback. 
Subjects were provided with a a copy of their opponent's matrices and reproduction 
of their matrices on the same page. This allowed subjects to simultaneously 
consider the interests of the parties. They were told1 "We thought you would like to 
know a little about the other persons interests in the negotiation you have just 
completed. Here is a copy of the other person's payoff schedule for the negotiation 
you have just completed" (Thompson et al 1992). 
DEPENDENT MEASURES 
The basic unit used for statistical analysis was the dyad. Each dyad was assigned a 
score for their overall performance1 as well as two performance scores and two 
judgment accuracy scores. This meant that for each dyad five scores were obtained. 
These were: overall performance1 performance on logroll issues1 performance on 
compatible issues1 judgment accuracy on logroll issues and judgment accuracy on 
compatible issues. Scores on the two distributive issues were not measured1 
because they sum to the same amount in each task1 independent of negotiator 
performance. 
This meant that the performance of each dyad was calculated using three measures 
of joint performance: the overall performance of the dyad1 the negotiator's ability to 
logroll1 and the negotiator's capacity to identify the existence of compatible issues. 
Overall performance was calculated simply by summing the settlement points 
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earned by both negotiators for all the issues in the task. Performance measures for 
logroll issues were calculated by summing the settlement points earned by both 
negotiators on the two logroll issues for that task. Performance measures for the 
compatible issues were calculated in a similar fashion, i.e. by summing the 
settlement points earned by both negotiators on the compatible issue, for that task. 
Judgment accuracy scores were taken to indicate how well each individual 
negotiator was able to identify their opponent's interests, on the logroll issues and 
the compatible issues. Measures of judgment accuracy were computed for the 
logroll issues by calculating the difference between the negotiator's estimates of the 
opponent's interests and the true value of the logrolling issues to the opponent, for 
each task. The absolute differences were summed across each of the settlement 
alternatives for the two logroll issues (e.g. salary and medicat see Appendix 1) to 
calculated judgment error. Error scores could range from 0-2800. Negotiators who 
believed their interests were the same as their opponent's had an error score of 2800 
(illustrative of the fixed pie myth). Those who believed their interests were 
different to those of their opponent on the two logroll issues, will have a perfectly 
accurate judgment score of 0. Intermediate values between these two poles also 
exist. 
For example, if a negotiator assumes the fixed pie myth, i.e. they expect their 
opponent's interests to be the same as theirs, specifically their highest priority is 
salary and the lowest medical. The figures in bold are the opponent's actual values 
on the logroll issues (see Table 4t while the others are the negotiator's guesses at 
their opponent's values (see Table 5). The negotiator's judgment accuracy score 
would be calculated using a formula similar to that used in earlier research by 
Thompson & Hastie (1990). For example: 
Absolute [(660-100) + (495-75) + (330-50) + (165-25) + (100-660) 
+ (75-495)+ (50-330) + (25-165)] = 2800 
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TABLE 4: Actual Payoff Matrices for Opponent 
SALARY (1) VAC RISE DATE MED (1) 
$24 (660) 3 Wks (240) 15 % (360) May 5 (300) 100% (100) 
$23 (495) 2.5 Wks (180) 12 % (270) May 10 (225) 80% (75) 
$22 (330) 2 Wks (120) 9 % (180) May 13 (150) 60% (50) 
$21 (165) 1.5 Wks (60) 6 % (90) May 15 (75) 40% (25) 
$20 (0) 1 Wk (0) 3% (0) May 27 (0) 20% (0) 
TABLE 5: Negotiator's Guess at Opponents Payoff Matrices 
SALARY (1) VAC RISE DATE MED (1) 
$24 (100) 3 Wks (240) 15 % (360) May 5 (0) 100% (660) 
$23 (75) 2.5 Wks (180) 12 % (270) May 10 (75) 80% (495) 
$22 (50) 2 Wks (120) 9 % (180) May 13 (150) 60% (330) 
$21 (25) 1.5 Wks (60) 6 % (90) May 15 (225) 40% (165) 
$20 (0) 1 Wk (0) 3% (0) May 27 (300) 20% (0) 
Judgment accuracy on the compatible issue for each task was calculated using the 
following guidelines: if the negotiator believed their opponent's interests in the 
compatible issue was the same as theirs they were assigned 1 (perfect accuracyt if 
they thought their opponent's interests were opposed to their own a O (complete 
inaccuracy) was assigned, or a 0.5 if the negotiator was indifferent to the 




RESULTS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
This chapter outlines the effects upon negotiator behaviour of the two independent 
measures, feedback and gender pairing and reviews the effects of these measures 
upon the performance and judgment accuracy of each dyad. 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE 
In order to establish which experimental conditions produced the best negotiation 
performance, a measure of overall performance was taken across the four 
negotiation tasks. This measure sums the points earned by each individual 
negotiator for each task and adds the scores for both negotiators together, 
producing a measure of overall dyadic performance, for each negotiation task. 
Scores could range from (0-1660). All dyads reached agreement. 
TABLE 6: Overall Performance 
TASK 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 
Mixed no feedback (n=10) 2107 2246.5 2283.5 2392 2257.25 
Female feedback (n=10) 1978.5 2041 2103 2267 2097.375 
Male feedback (n=10) 2188 2318 2283 2468.5 2314.375 
Mixed feedbackjn~13/ 2052 2188.5 2286 2227 2188.375 
2081.375 2198.5 2238.875 2338.875 2214.3438 
Note: Higher scores indicate better performance 
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A 2 way ANOV A with repeated measures, was performed to examine the impact of 
Condition and Round upon the overall performance of each dyad. There was a 
significant main effect for Condition, F (336) = 3.687, p<.05. Scores on this measure 
ranged from 2097.375 to 2314.375 (M= 2214.344, SD= 80.94) 
A one way ANOV A was performed to determine which characteristic of the four 
conditions (presence or absence of feedback, same or mixed gender pairing, all 
male or all female pairing), was responsible for this effect. A significant main effect 
was found for same gender pairing. Overall performance was greatest in the 
male/male condition (M= 2314.375, SD= 141.5388), F (1,18) = 8.443, p<.05. 
There was also a significant main effect for the Round factor, such that overall 
performance was greatest in round 4 (M= 2338.625, SD= 192.5303.), then round 3 
(M= 2238.875, SD= 221.0856), then round 2 (M= 2198.5, SD= 226.4758) and then 
round 1 (M= 2081.357, SD= 249.6638, F (3, 108) = 15.7684, p<.05. 
Orthogonal polynomial contrasts indicated the presence of a significant linear effect, 
such that outcome improved over rounds, F (1,158) = 24.19, p<.01. Outcome 
performance increased from Round 1 to Round 2 to Round 3 and then Round 4. 
LOGROLLING 
Performance 
Measuring logrolling performance, allows the estimation of the extent to which 
negotiators make trade offs between issues that differ in importance to each party. 
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TABLE 7: Logroll Performance 
TASK 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 
Mixed no feedback (n=l0) 928 1136.5 1098.5 1222 1096.25 
Female feedback (n=l0) 816 886 895.5 1089 921.625 
Male feedback (n=lO) 1018 1157 1166 1262.5 1150.875 
Mixed feedback (n=lO) 942 1023.5 1110 1082 1039.375 
926 1050.75 1067.5 1163.875 1052.031 
Note: Higher scores indicate more integrative settlements. 
A 2 way repeated measures ANOV A was performed to examine the impact of 
Condition and Round on subjects performance on logrolling issues. There was a 
significant main effect for Condition F (3,36) = 4.492, p<.05. Scores on this measure 
ranged from 921.625 to 1150.875 (M= 1052.031 , SD= 84.987) 
Logrolling performance was greatest in the male/male condition (M= 4603.5, SD= 
561.635), and then the all female condition (M= 3686.5, SD= 639.01), F (1,18) = 
11.618, p<.05. 
There was a significant main effect across the four rounds of negotiation, F (3,108) = 
16.799, p<.05. Scores on this measure ranged from 816-1262.5, (M= 1677.03, SD= 
223.21 . Logrolling performance was greatest in the later tasks. The results were: 
task 1 (M= 926, SD= 225.875), task 2 (M= 1050.75, SD= 220.717), task 3 (M= 1067.5, 
SD= 212.952), task 4 (M= 1163.875, SD= 177.722), 
An orthogonal polynomial trend analysis, using logroll scores as the repeated 
measure variable, was conducted. The results indicate a significant linear effect, 
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suggesting that logrolling improved over rounds, F (1,158) = 24.19, p<.01. 
Logrolling performance improved as subjects completed more tasks. 
Judgment Accuracy 
This measure of judgment accuracy measures negotiator's estimations of the 
relative importance of the two logroll issues to their opponent. 
TABLE 8: Judgment Accuracy for Logrolling Issues 
TASK 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 
Mixed no feedback (n=10) 3190 3038 3120 2410 2939.5 
Female feedback (n=10) 3475 2765 2125 2303 2667 
Male feedback (n=l0) 3575 2700 1775 1940 2497.5 
Mixed feedback (n=10) 3810 2415 2490 2160 2718.75 
3512.5 2729.5 2377.5 2203.25 2705.688 
Note: Lower scores indicate greater judgment accuracy 
A 2 way repeated measures ANOV A was performed to examine the impact of 
Condition and Round on subject's judgment accuracy on logrolling issues. 
Condition failed to have a significant effect upon judgment accuracy F(3,36) = .187, 
p>05. There was however, a significant main effect for Round, F (3,156) = 5.607, 
p<.01. Scores on this measure ranged from 1940-3810 (M= 2705.69, SD= 589.24). 
Judgment accuracy on the logrolling issues was greatest in the later tasks, task 1 
(M= 3512.5, SD= 1577.963), task 2 (M= 2729.5, SD= 1524.43), task 3 (M= 2377.5, SD= 
1562.048), task 4 (M= 2203.25, SD= 1539.193) 
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Orthogonal polynomial contrasts indicated a significant linear effect, such that 
judgment accuracy on logrolling issues increased over rounds, F (1,158) = 15.266, 
p<.01. Judgment accuracy on the logrolling issues increased from Round 1 to 
Round 2 to Round 3 and then Round 4. This indicates that judgment accuracy 
improves as negotiators complete more tasks. 
Relationship Between Judgment Accuracy and Performance 
In general the results for judgment accuracy and performance on logrolling parallel 
one another. This is suggestive of the existence of a relationship between judgment 
accuracy and overall performance. To examine this issue, a correlation coefficient 
was computed between measures of judgment accuracy and overall performance. 
This showed that judgment accuracy and overall performance were significantly 
. correlated (r (40) = -.54, p<.001. The more negotiators understood their opponent's 
interests the better they performed. Remember that judgment accuracy is higher 
with lower scores and this accounts for the negative correlation coefficient. 
However, although, a correlation does exist, it is not high and as such does not 
account for much variance. 
COMPATIBLE ISSUES 
Performance 
This measure of performance examined the extent to which negotiators were able to 
reach agreement on issues in which their preferences were identical to their 
opponents. Across all negotiations 77.5% of the negotiators reached the optimal 
outcome for the compatible issue, while 22.5% of the negotiator pairs settled for 
suboptimal outcomes. A total of 18 pairs (45%) of negotiators reached the optimal 
outcome for each round, while the remaining 22 pairs (55%) failed to chose the best 
alternative in at least one of the four rounds. 
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TABLE 9: Compatible Issue Performance 
TASK 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 
Mixed no feedback (n=10) 570 510 585 570 558.75 
Female feedback (n=10) 562.5 550.5 570 573 564 
Male feedback (n=l0) 570 555 505 606 559 
Mixed feedback (n=10) 510 565 570 555 550 
553.12 545.12 557.5 576 557.94 
A 2 way ANOV A with repeated measures was performed to examine the impact of 
Condition and Round on subject performance on compatible issues. The main 
effects for Condition and Round were both nonsignificant for this measure p>.05. 
Neither were any interactions significant. 
Judgment Accuracy 
Compatible issue accuracy measures the negotiator's perceptions of the relative 
importance of issues to the other party. Judgment accuracy on the compatible issue 
for each task was calculated for each dyad by summing the points earned by each 
negotiator on the compatible issue in each task. Perfect judgment accuracy was 
scored 1, totally inaccurate judgment scored 0, and if the negotiator was indifferent 
to the alternatives they were scored 0.5. Scores ranged from 0.75-1.55 (M= 1.24, SD 
=0.21). 
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TABLE 10: Judgment Accuracy for Compatible Issues 
TASK 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 
Mixed no feedback (n=l0) 1.2 1.45 1.3 1.2 1.29 
Female feedback (n=lO) 1.25 1.5 1.55 1.3 1.4 
Male feedback (n=l0) 1.28 .94 1.11 1.33 1.17 
Mixed feedback (n=lO) .75 1.2 1.55 1.25 1.19 
1.12 1.27 1.38 1.26 1.26 
Note: Higher scores indicate greater judgment accuracy 
A 2 way ANOV A with repeated measures was performed to examine the impact of 
Condition and Round on subject performance on compatible issues. No significant 
main effects were present for this measure, p>.05. Contrasting with judgment 
accuracy results for logroll issues, compatible issue judgment accuracy was not 
affected by Round. Interestingly a significant interaction effect was found between 
condition and judgment accuracy for the compatible issue F (9,105) =2.21, p<.05 .. 
Relationship Between Judgment Accuracy and Performance 
In general the results for judgment accuracy and performance on compatible issues 
parallel each another. This suggests the existence of a relationship between 
judgment accuracy and performance. To examine this issue, a correlation 
coefficient was computed between measures of judgment accuracy and overall 
performance. This showed that judgment accuracy and overall performance were 
significantly correlated (r (39) = .37, p<.02. The more negotiators understood their 





The purpose of the present research was to explore the impact of the gender 
constitution of dyads upon negotiator performance. The rationale for the present 
research, derived from. behavioural decision theory postulates (Bazerm.an & Carroll, 
1987t that the gender constitution of the dyad will affect the choices and judgments 
made by each negotiator about the negotiation situation. As predicted there was a 
significant difference between the overall performance of male and fem.ale dyads, 
with male dyads outperforming fem.ale dyads. The present findings support our 
rationale, providing evidence for the existence of a systematic relationship between 
gender and negotiation performance. 
Given the general debate in the contemporary negotiation literature concerning the 
bargaining effectiveness of the respective genders, the current findings present an 
interesting pattern of results. Early individual differences research yielded an 
overwhelming assortment of contradictory and inconclusive findings. Rubin & 
Brown (1975) proposed a reconciliation of the then existing research, concluding 
that no systematic relationship existed between gender and negotiation 
performance. Findings of the present research contradict this conclusion. 
The manner in which the individual approaches the negotiation context is critical to 
their subsequent behaviour. A negotiator's interpretation of the negotiation context 
is central to the actions they take. Each individual's cognitive disposition combines 
with their prior negotiation experience to allow negotiators to recognise the 
integrative potential inherent in any negotiation situation. Different genders bring 
many different interpretative assumptions to the negotiation context. Men m.ay 
learn/ discover the integrative potential in a situation, earlier than do worn.en. 
Research suggests that a negotiator's initial perceptions affect subsequent 
judgments made by the negotiator during the negotiations (Asch, 1946; Anderson, 
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1965; Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer & Steinman, 1975; Kelly & Stahelski, 1970). 
Empirical research provides further support for the assumption that all negotiators 
have expectations concerning the nature of the conflict, distribution of resources 
and interests of their opponents (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). It is possible the 
differential performance found between male and female dyads in the present 
experiment may be due to differences in the respective abilities of the genders to 
recognize the potential for joint gain. 
Research by Pinkley (1990) & Druckman & Zechmeister (1973) conclude that men 
and women perceive negotiation contexts differently. Men it seems, approach 
negotiations with a view to obtaining an outcome with the greatest benefit, i.e. 
maximizing their own earnings. Women however, are more likely to adopt an 
interpersonal focus toward negotiations, and in anticipation of future interactions 
with their opponent would be likely to expect a negotiation characterized by 
compromise. An unpublished study by Neale & Northcraft (cited in Neale & 
Northcraft, 1991) found correlations between scores on a "Propensity to Negotiate" 
scale, and gender. They concluded that males were more likely to view a potential 
exchange as an opportunity to negotiate than were females. 
This research merely identifies the existence o0ender based differences in the · 
overall performance of negotiators, and provides one possible explanation for the 
present findings. The role of pre-negotiation expectations and the capacity of the 
respective genders to identify integrative potential in negotiations, is worthy of 
further empirical research. In addition, it must be acknowledged that the effects 
stemming from cognitive biases (Bazerman, 1983) may possibly be involved in the 
gender results. Future research on gender differences in overall negotiation 
performance is necessary in order to determine exactly what mechanisms are 
responsible these differences. 
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The discovery of a significant linear effect, such that both overall performance and 
logroll performance improved over rounds, is evidence of the existence of a 
learning effect. The more tasks the negotiators completed, the more successful they 
were. This supports both the common sense assumption that a relationship exists 
between performance and experience, and earlier research by Thompson. 
Thompson (1990b), concluded that experienced bargainers gain a larger share of the 
joint resources, when compared to lesser experienced negotiators. It is important to 
note however that it is not practise with negotiation tasks that is responsible for 
increases in performance. But rather, success in the identification of logroll issues, 
and exposure to tasks with integrative potential that constitute the key ingredients 
for increases in negotiation performance (Thompson, 1990a). 
FIXED-PIE JUDGMENT ACCURACY 
Fixed-pie judgment, i.e. the assumption by the negotiator that their opponent's 
interests are completely opposed to their own, represents a serious judgment error 
(Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson, 1991; Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Neale & 
Northcraft (cited in Thompson, 1991); Thompson, 1990a. It appears that this bias is 
equally pervasive in both genders, specifically in same gender dyads. These 
findings lend further support to earlier research attesting to the prevalence and 
tenacity of the fixed-pie bias in negotiator behaviour (Thompson et al 1992). The 
results of the present research suggest that gender does not affect the prevalence of 
the fixed-pie error. 
However it should be noted that in the present experiment we were particularly 
interested in the effect of the gender constitution of the dyad upon the negotiator's 
ability to identify compatible issues, and its subsequent implications for prevalence 
of the fixed-pie myth. It is of interest to note that although the gender pairing of the 
dyads affects the joint outcome achieved, that judgment accuracy of the negotiators 
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was not affected. Judgment accuracy on both dependent measures, logroll and 
compatible interests failed to be significantly affected by the gender pairing of the 
dyads. This suggests that both male and female dyads are equally susceptible to the 
fixed pie bias. 
These findings are a strong indication that the performance differential between 
male and female dyads, was not due to the prevalence of the fixed pie myth. It is 
possible that the prevalence of other cognitive biases maybe responsible for the 
differential performance of the dyads. Bazerman (1983) identified five unique 
systematic biases that create cognitive limitations affecting negotiator success: (1) 
the impact of negotiator's frame, (2) the mythical fixed-pie, (3) the non-rational 
escalation of conflict, (4) negotiator overconfidence, and (5) the winner's curse. 
Although we have found that the fixed-pie bias is not responsible for the 
performance differential between the dyads, it is possible that one of the other 
biases may be. 
From the present results it is not possible to speculate which of them may be 
responsible for the performance differential between the genders. However it is 
important to point out that the mentioned biases may well be a subset of the many 
biases that affect negotiator judgment. Bazerman (1983) notes, there are many 
possible biases that affect negotiator judgment that have not been formally 
identified, let alone measured. These include e.g. negotiators perceiving themselves 
as cleverer, superior and more intelligent than their opponents. It is possible that 
one of the these lesser mentioned possible biases may be responsible for the 
differential performance of the dyads. Further research is necessary in order to 
replicate the findings of the present research and to identify the judgmental 




Contrary to expectations, the judgment accuracy of the subjects was not affected by 
the provision of cognitive feedback. Such findings are inconsistent, surprisingly, 
with earlier research by Thompson et al (1992), who concluded that the provision of 
cognitive feedback increased the likelihood of the achievement of integrative 
agreements. The provision of feedback was intended to prompt negotiators to 
learn about the underlying structure of the task)ls"thus facilitating increases in 
performance. From casual observation it appears that subjects failed to abstract 
information about the underlying structure of the task from the feedback, and as a 
direct consequence failed to improve their performance. 
Feedback, as manipulated in this study differed qualitatively from that which often 
operates in extra-laboratory settings. In real world negotiations, both before, during 
and after negotiations, the negotiating parties are surrounded by feedback from a 
variety of different sources. For example, negotiators may be aware of the 
reputation of their opponent, and their opponent's interests from prior negotiations, 
before beginning the exchange. During the negotiations, through consideration of 
the patterns of offer and acceptance, negotiators are provided with feedback 
concerning their opponent's interests. At the completion of the negotiation, 
negotiator's receive feedback on their performance by determining if they have 
achieved their goals, and their own subjective response to the negotiation outcome. 
Although the negotiator may be exposed to many of these forms of feedback during 
negotiations, if they are not identified, processed and evaluated by the negotiators 
they will have little or no effect upon facilitating increased performance in 
subsequent negotiations. 
Findings from the present study suggest that future research on cognitive feedback 
must include a means of ensuring that subjects actively process and evaluate the 
feedback with which they are provided, if a similar experimental paradigm is to be 
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followed. This is supported by the second feedback mechanism* of the judgment-
action-outcome model, which proposes that individuals must evaluate and 
interpret feedback before it will be effective. The key implication is that mere 
presentation of feedback does not ensure its utilization. Presentation of cognitive 
feedback in both experimental and applied settings, must therefore be coupled with 
a mechanism to ensure that it is acknowledged and interpreted by the negotiator, if 
the feedback is to effectively complete its self-correcting function. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
One important issue concerns the generalizability of the present findings to real 
world contexts. Although the present study was conducted in a laboratory setting, 
the negotiation tasks used were based on real world negotiation tasks, and 
contained many of the elements present in actual negotiations (Schlenker & 
Bonoma, 1978). However,, in the real world, the negotiation context is often 
complex and uncertain. The existence of positive zones of agreement may or may 
not be obvious to the negotiator. Research notes that tasks with integrative 
potential, are common in real world negotiations (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Raiffa, 
1982; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982). It is important to note that although the present 
research focuses upon variable sum tasks, it does not assume that all tasks have 
integrative potential. 
The present research examined behaviour in a laboratory setting, employing a 
paradigm based on that by Thompson et al (1992). While the negotiation tasks 
involved conflict situations individuals may encounter in real life, they maybe 
criticised as lacking the inherent complexity of real world negotiations. The 
negotiation environment in the present experiment was simple, with well defined 
priorities and limitations. In real world negotiations, the priorities and interests of 
the negotiating parties are often not as clearly defined, nor as easily controlled. This 
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points to the need to examine the dynamics of the negotiation process in more 
complex and realistic settings (Carroll, Bazerman & Maury, 1988). This may 
require using research paradigms that are richer, in both the form and the content of 
the material they present to subjects. 
To date the majority of research on integrative bargaining has been conducted upon 
student samples. As a consequence, such findings have considerable limitations 
when generalized to applied settings with experienced negotiators. One rather 
interesting difference comes from the work of Neale & Northcraft (1986) who 
suggested that amateurs are able to identify integrative potential in a situation faster 
than experts. Given such differences the present findings may be restricted in their 
capacity to be generalizable to negotiators characteristic of applied settings. This 
represents a limitation of the current study, due to the differential approaches 
adopted by students and experts towards negotiations. 
In an applied setting, negotiations frequently involve participants with a diversity 
of backgrounds, experiences and characteristics. Failure to observe evidence of 
individual differences in negotiation behaviour may be attributed to the narrow 
range of individual differences within experimental populations (Hamner, 1980). 
Researchers tend to use homogenous populations in these studies, i'e subjects of the 
same gender, age, race, socio-economic status. The effects of a specific personality 
predisposition may fail to be present due to the similarity between individuals in 
experimental populations. Existing research is criticised for examining differences 
between individuals which are not appreciably or meaningfully different from each 
other, rather than assessing groups with distinct individual differences. 
As previously mentioned, the feedback manipulation in the present experiment was 
unsuccessful due to the subjects' failure to process the information presented to 
them. It would appear that subjects in the present experiment misinterpreted or 
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indeed failed to interpret the feedback with which they were provided. Subjects 
appeared to see the presentation of feedback as an opportunity to assess their 
judgment accuracy, i.e they compared their guess at their opponent's schedule with 
their opponents actual schedule. Or alternatively, many overtly totalled up how 
many points their opponent's earned, and using the feedback schedule compared it 
with what they themselves had earned. They used this as an approximation, to 
determine which party had won that round of negotiations. In short, negotiators 
appeared not to utilise the feedback as intended1 i.e. to learn about the underlying 
structure of the task1 but rather used it as a means of calculating their outcome in 
terms of success or failure. 
Future research should include a measure to ensure that the feedback provided is 
interpreted and evaluated by the subjects. One possible approach was used by 
Thompson et al (1992). Thompson et al required their subjects to complete an open-
ended response following the presentation of feedback. Open-ended responses 
allowed Thompson et al to explore the assumptions made by negotiators about the 
interests and priorities of their opponents. Thompson's subjects were required to 
study the feedback information and record their response to it. These responses 
were independently coded by experimenters, and points awarded for accurate 
inferences made by negotiators about the other party's interests. It is recommended 
that future research exploring the effects of feedback upon negotiator performance 
include a similar open-ended response measure. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The development of a theory of negotiator cognition must expand upon existing 
research1 by demonstrating not only the existence of judgment heuristics, but also 
the factors which mediate their effects. Each negotiator brings to the negotiation 
context 'person variables', which are the product of prior experience, learning, 
50 
biological limitations and memory. This requires a re-focusing of contemporary 
research more closely upon the cognitive process of the negotiator, by providing 
answers as to why negotiators deviate from rational decision making process, in 
terms of individual differences and their impact upon elements of decision making. 
The mechanics of judgment and choice have been widely defined in terms of task 
and context variables, and little attention has been paid to the contribution made to 
the negotiation setting by the negotiator. 
For example, one explanation for the current inconsistencies in individual 
differences research, centers on pre-negotiation behaviour. Individual differences 
may act as a sieve, separating those with specific traits, characteristics or 
predispositions to engage in negotiations, from those without such characteristics. 
Therefore existing attempts to examine individual differences in negotiation 
behaviour would be a fruitless exercise, as a consequence of prior self-selection. This 
is an area worthy of further empirical attention, in~~ffort to further collective 
. /\ 
understanding of the dynamics of negotiation. 
It is important in the development of methodologies for future research to devise 
research methods that make explicit rather than infer, aspects of decision making 
processes. All too often judgment biases and negotiator cognitions are inferred on 
the basis of negotiation outcomes, rather than from direct observation (Thompson, 
1990a). The objective of behavioural decision theory is to develop a blue print of 
the negotiator's mind, in order to accurately predict their behaviour. In order to do 
this it is necessary to move away from comparing negotiator behaviour with 
predictions made by early normative models. Research by Carroll et al (1988) on 
decision-making process in confrontational situations and Thompson ;,lrastie's 
(1990) work on judgment error, were the first to utilize a "think aloud" measure as a 
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means of directly examining negotiator perceptions. Such measures present 
potentially a more complete set of methodological tools for allowing closer 
examination of the cognitive processes of negotiators. 
Increased attention to the scientific study of negotiation has been directed firstly, at 
improving negotiator judgment by delineating ways in which negotiators deviate 
from rationality, and second by attempting to provide a means of eliminating these 
sub-optimal heuristics from the negotiator's cognitive repertoire. We believe that 
an additional approach to the improvement of negotiator behaviour lies in the 
identification of individual differences among negotiators which may effect their 
subsequent decision making processes. Future research must move beyond the 
demonstration of the existence of inconsistencies, towards examination of the 
factors which may mediate these variables which maybe associated with sub-
optimal decisions, i.e. if the longer term aim is to eliminate them from negotiator 
behaviour. Negotiation researchers need to keep in mind the implicit objective, i.e. 
to find ways to improve resolution behaviours. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that until further research is done on the effects of gender constitution of 
the dyad that no firm conclusions maybe drawn. The present research suggests that 
the gender constitution of the dyad affects negotiation performance, specifically 
when negotiators are paired with an opponent of the same gender. Although 
current findings are suggestive of a relationship between gender and performance, 
they merely point to its existence and do not present any firm explanations for the 
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RENTAL (1) DEPOSIT (1) UTILITIES (c) LENGHT (d) DATE (d) 
$55 (0) $150 (0) $20 (0) 3 Yrs (0) May 5 (0) 
$60 (165) $140 (25) $40 (75) 2.5 Yrs (90) May 10 (60) 
$65 (330) $130 (50) $60 (150) 2 Yrs (180) May 13 (120) 
$70 (495) $120 (75) $80 (225) 1.5 Yrs (270) May 15 (180) 
$75 (660) $110 (100) $100 (300) 1 Yr (360) May 27 (240) 
RENTAL (1) DEPOSIT (1) UTILITIES ( c) LENGHT (d) DATE (d) 
$55 (100) $150 (660) $20 (0) 3 Yrs (360) May 5 (240) 
$60 (75) $140 (495) $40 (75) 2.5 Yrs (270) May 10 (180) 
$65 (50) $130 (330) $60 (150) 2 Yrs (180) May 13 (120) 
$70 (25) $120 (165) $80 (225) 1.5 Yrs (90) May 15 (60) 















WARRANTY DATE (1) 
6 Months (0) 5 Weeks (0) 
12 Months (60) 4 Weeks (165) 
18 Months (120) 3 Weeks (330) 
24 Months (180) 2 Weeks (495) 
30 Months (240) 1 Week (660) 
WARRANTY DATE (1) 
6 Months (240) 5 Weeks (100) 
12 Months (180) 4 Weeks (75) 
18 Months (120) 3 Weeks (50) 
24 Months (60) 2 Weeks (25) 
30 Months (0) 1 Week (0) 
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COLOR(d) RADIO (1) 
Black (0) None (0) 
Red (90) AM (25) 
Blue (180) AM/FM (50) 
Green (270) TAPE (75) 
Yellow (360) C.D (100) 
COLOR(d) RADIO (1) 
Black (360) None (660) 
Red (270) AM (495) 
Blue (180) AM/FM (330) 
Green (90) TAPE (165) 




DESTINATION LENGHT (c) COST (d) TRANSPORT LEAVING (1) 
Auckland (240) 5 Weeks (300) $3000 (360) Fly (660) May 5 (100) 
Well-ton (180) 4 Weeks (225) $2400 (270) Drive (495) May 10 (75) 
C-church (120) 3 Weeks (150) $1800 (180) Bus (330) May 13 (50) 
Dunedin (60) 2 Weeks (75) $1200 (90) Train (165) May 15 (25) 
Invercargill (0) 1 Week (0) $600 (0) Hitch (0) May 27 (O) 
DESTINATION LENGHT (c) COST (d) TRANSPORT LEAVING (1) 
Auckland (0) 5 Weeks (300) $3000 (0) Fly (0) May 5 (0) 
Wellington (60) 4 Weeks (225) $2400 (90) Drive (25) May 10 (165) 
C-church (120) 3 Weeks (150) $1800 (180) Bus (50) May 13 (330) 
Dunedin (180) 2 Weeks (75) $1200 (270) Train (75) May 15 (495) 
Inv-cargill (240) 1 Week (0) $600 (360) Hitch (100) May27 (660) 
APPENDIX4 
PAYOFF MATRICES QUIZ 
1. As a negotiator, which issue gives you the most points in this task? 






2. As a negotiator, which issue gives you the least points in this task? 




















Reason for the project: To explore the dynamics of bilateral negotiations and the 
factors which effect the achievement of integrative agreements. 
Your task in this project: You will be required to complete several tasks which 
involve negotiating with an opponent to reach an agreement. In return for you 
participation, you will receive a ticket in a $100 lottery, your chances of winning are 
proportional to the number of points earned in the experiment. 
Risks associated with this project: Nil 
Confidentiality: It will not be necessary to identify you during the experiment. 
Your confidentiality will be assured at all times. All data collected will be group 
data. 
Voluntary participation: You are aware that participation in this experiment is 
purely voluntary. You may terminate your participation at any stage during the 
experiment. 
Time required: 1 hour of your time will be required in order to complete the 
experiment. 
Name of researcher/supervisor: Justine Reese/Bruce Jamieson. 
67 
I agree to participate in the project described above, on the understanding that if 
at any time I wish to withdraw from the experiment I may, without prejudice , do 
so. All information collected will be confidential as will the identity of the 
participants. 
Name: 
Signature 
Date: 
